In this paper we estimate by matching techniques the effects of a French retraining program on the reemployment rate of displaced workers. This program, called "Conventions de conversion", was intended to improve reemployment prospects of displaced workers by proposing them retraining and job seeking assistance for a period of six months beginning just after the dismissal. Our empirical analysis is based upon non-experimental data collected by the French Ministry of Labour. Matching estimates show that this program succeeded in increasing the employment rate of trainees by approximately 6 points of percentage in the medium-term, namely in the second and third years after the date of entry into the program. This improvement is essentially due to an increase of their reemployment rate in regular jobs, namely jobs under long-term labour contracts.
Introduction
Improving the effectiveness of active labour market programs (ALMPs) is a main policy area identified by the OECD Jobs Strategy for helping to reduce structural unemployment (OECD, 1994 and 1996) . In an era of tight government budgets and a growing disbelief regarding the positive effects of ALMPs, evaluation of these programs becomes imperative.
1 On the one hand, the persistently high level of unemployment rates stresses the necessity of assistance programs in helping unemployed participants to find a job faster. On the other, it is often doubted whether the positive effects of active programs outweigh their costs. Moreover, advocates of a pessimistic perspective even argue that participation in such programs in periods of high unemployment may be seen as a negative signal for some employers and could therefore have a counter-productive impact on the employment performance of participants.
Active labour market policies have been increasingly introduced in France since the midseventies, when unemployment started to increase. These policies were targeted to workers with high unemployment risks, such as young people, older or displaced workers. They are similar to those implemented in other European countries, France being a median user. In
France, the scope of public interventions is rather diversified. Most of the programs consist in providing training, job seeking support, vocational course, and adaptation training (for the youngest). Microeconometric studies carried out by Bonnal et al. (1997) , Fougère et al. (2000) , and Brodaty et al.(2001) have investigated the impact of such policies on employment prospects of young people and unskilled workers. However, few contributions have addressed the issue of employment programs for laid off or displaced workers 2 .
Our study concerns a retraining program, called "Convention de conversion", which was set up in France during the eighties in order to improve labour market prospects of displaced workers. 3 It consists in providing an immediate and individual support to displaced workers for a period of six months (beginning just after the dismissal) by proposing retraining and job seeking assistance. This support is granted to workers up to 57 years old who have at least two years of seniority in their former firm. US training programs mainly focus on increasing the productivity and earnings of low-income individuals. In contrast, the main purpose of this French program is to prevent or to reduce unemployment by increasing the participants' employment rates rather than their earnings.
Thus our study boils down to the following question: do program participants manage to find a job, and more precisely a permanent job, faster? Hence, the outcome of interest is not only the re-employment probability, but also the probability to find a long-term labour contract.
Our empirical analysis uses non-experimental data collected by the French Ministry of This survey has been completed by another one, called "Trajectoires des adhérents à une convention de conversion" ("Event histories of displaced workers participating to the 'Convention de conversion' program"). This second survey was conducted in the same local areas with the same questionnaire, but exclusively on displaced workers joining the program during the same initial period.
The major challenge of any evaluation study using non-experimental data is to treat the potential selection bias. Displaced workers who have decided to join the program might have individual characteristics that would be different from those who have not joined it.
Workers participating in such a program may be less or more able to find a permanent job (namely, a job with a long-term labour contract) compared to otherwise identical nonparticipants. The difference in post-program outcomes between participants and the control group of non-participants may thus reflect those individual factors rather than a causal effect of the program. To estimate the effect of the training program on the re-employment probability of displaced workers, we use statistical matching techniques. 4 In fact, the absence of valid instruments does not allow us to evaluate this effect by estimating parametric or semiparametric selection models. Moreover, we think that our data verify the three conditions put forth by Smith and Todd (2001) for a satisfying application of matching estimators: (i) for both groups (treated and controls), the data come from the same administrative source, so that outcomes are measured in an analogous way, (ii) participants in the program and nonparticipants reside in the same local labour markets, and (iii) the data contain a sufficiently rich set of variables relevant to modelling the program-participation decision.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the literature on displaced workers. In the third section, we give a brief summary of the French institutional framework concerning layoffs, and then we present the main specific features of the retraining program that we evaluate. The fourth section presents the database. The fifth section presents the statistical strategy. A sixth section presents and comments the estimates. The last section summarizes the main results.
Literature review
Worker displacement involves an involuntarily job separation caused by adverse economic
conditions. In such a case, the job separation is initiated by the employer and not caused by the individual worker's performance. In general displaced workers are more likely to experience longer unemployment spells and to incur higher search costs, including possibly costs involved by retraining and moving to areas with higher employment opportunities.
Displaced workers have been the subject of an extensive literature (see surveys by Fallick, 1996, and Kletzer, 1998) . The basic stylised facts are: 1) displaced workers experience longer unemployment spells and higher earning losses than the other unemployed workers (Swaim and Podgursky, 1991, Jacobson et al., 1993) ; 2) the duration of the subsequent unemployment spell increases with job tenure (Fallick, 1996) , because workers with high tenure have a higher level of specific human capital investment in their firms and in their industry or occupational sectors; 3) the duration of this unemployment spell is affected by the cause of displacement; for instance, Swaim and Podgursky (1991) found that workers displaced because of plant closures experience one third fewer weeks of unemployment than those who are laid off by ongoing establishments. The econometric analysis conducted by Gibbons and Katz (1991) has shown that this result could not be attributed solely to differences in observable worker characteristics. These authors argued that it is due to a "lemon" effect: prospective employers perceive laid-off workers as being of low ability compared to people who lose their job due to plant closure. But, as noticed by Fallick (1996) , "such comparisons cannot address how displacement differs from other potential movements into unemployment. A useful direction for future research would be to compare displaced workers to workers who enter unemployment in other ways -for example, new entrants and re-entrants to the labor force, workers who quit, workers whose previous job was explicitly temporary, workers who are permanently discharged for cause, and those who experience temporary layoffs."
In view of the difficulties the displaced workers face in achieving reinsertion, debates arise on the suitable policies to be undertaken. As there is little prospect of returning to a comparable job within a reasonable period of time (because of limited opportunities in the same industry, occupation or region), displaced workers may need retraining or search assistance. While retraining of displaced workers is not a new policy, programs to assist displaced workers have gained a renewed interest. In general, such programs offer job search assistance along with formal training. In his landmark study on displaced workers, Leigh (1990) concludes that job search assistance is the most cost-effective program for displaced workers. It also appears that training can shorten the periods of unemployment, but it does not affect long-term earnings. Leigh (1990) synthesizes some findings from his examination of labour market policies in Sweden, Germany, Japan, Great Britain and Australia. The main results are the following: job search assistance is relatively cheap and should be made freely available to those recommended by their case managers; quality assessment should be conducted for those wishing to join a retraining program; training should be locally based and characterized by decentralized decision-making to meet local needs more appropriately. Dar and Gill (1998) , after studying eleven retraining programs in six countries, concluded that such programs are generally no more effective than job search assistance in increasing re-employment prospects. As a result, they should be targeted to those who can benefit the most from them: women and minorities (Moore, 1990) , industry-switchers (Stock, 1998) , laid off workers from manufacturing (Kletzer, 1998) , or those with high tenure (Jacobson et al., 1993) . In fact job search assistance and training appear to have some impact on the types of jobs that displaced workers obtain. Farber (1999 Farber ( , 2003 found that workers who lose their jobs are more likely to be reemployed in temporary jobs and, when reemployed in a permanent job, they earn significantly less than they did prior to their last job. Thus an obvious important consequence of job loss is the inability to find a new stable job.
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Despite of these negative consequences of job displacement, there are only a few studies evaluating the impact of long and intensive training programs on employment and wages of laid-off workers. For instance, Kodrzycki (1997) analyzes a sample of workers laid off between 1991 and 1994 who used assistance centers in Massachusetts operating under the provisions of the EDWAA amendment to Title III of the Job Training and Partnership Act.
These centers offer basic readjustment services such as counselling and job market information to all users. In addition, some displaced workers received education and/or job training programs at local colleges, universities, and specialized training facilities. Kodrzycki (1997) restricts the sample to workers who had previously been employed fulltime and who became reemployed at a new job. First, she finds that job training only (as opposed to job training combined with general education classes) tended to draw the workers with the highest reading abilities and previous earnings, while job training combined with education tended to draw less promising candidates. Then, applying ordinary least squares to nonexperimental data, she concludes that, "even if some training programs can be shown to provide positive job changes that eventually result in higher job satisfaction or greater income for displaced workers, they may still turn out not to be socially beneficial." In a more recent paper, Jacobson et al. (2005) However, these negative results should be counterbalanced by some studies which find that training programs have mixed effects (see, for instance, Gerfin and Lechner, 2002, and Lechner et al., 2005) , but also by the main conclusions of the recent meta-analysis, based on 97 international studies of active labour market policies, conducted by Card et al. (2009) . Card et al. (2009) point out in particular that longer-term evaluations tend to be more favourable than short-term evaluations and that classroom and on-the-job training programs appear to be particularly likely to yield more favourable medium-term than short-term impact estimates. Let us remark that our study contributes to this debate since the program that we evaluate involves classroom training and since we focus on its medium-term (2 nd year) and long-term (3 rd year) effects.
The institutional framework
French labour law distinguishes between layoffs for economic reasons and layoffs for personal reasons, such as inadequate performance or misconduct. A layoff for economic reason is defined as a displacement resulting from a reduction in the workload or a lost position or shift. This category excludes then laid-off workers due to own behaviour, but also quits, entries into unemployment due to the termination of a short-term labour contract, and new entries (or re-entries) into the labour force. This is a wider definition than the one proposed, for instance, by Fallick (1996) who notices that 1) displaced workers do not include workers fired for cause, 2) the displacement should have a structural cause, 3) displaced workers have a limited ability to return to a comparable job within a reasonable span of time, and 4) they are strongly attached to the sector in which they were employed. Our definition of displacement is closer to that proposed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which characterizes a displaced worker as someone at least 20 years old, with at least three years of tenure on a job, who lost that job (without being recalled) due to slack work, abolition of a position or shift, or plant closing or relocation.
During the 1990s the French labour market was characterized by numerous job losses; for instance, each month in 1998, on average 25,000 employees were laid off. One common characteristic of all layoffs for economic reasons is that employers are required to propose the option of participating in a retraining scheme (partially employer funded) to all employees who will be displaced. This clause became an actual right inscribed into the The employee joining the retraining program was made redundant but was not registered as being actually unemployed. The initial goal of this program was to avoid long unemployment spells for employees who were laid off for economic reasons. It consisted in providing an immediate and individual support to the displaced workers for a period of six months beginning just after the dismissal. What were the eligibility conditions?
Participation was voluntarily, but support was granted to workers up to 57 years old, having at least 2 years of seniority in the firm. Technical Units of Reinsertion ("Unités techniques de reclassement") were in charge of accompanying and reinserting participants.
They assessed the employee's professional records and then, proposed appropriate actions including job-seeking sessions, stressing self-employment opportunities, on-the-job assessment and extra training (computer, accounting, management, languages, etc…) . The benefit of extra education and support in job seeking throughout the program was meant to reduce the subsequent unemployment spell and more generally to improve the conditions of reinsertion into the labour market. During the first two months of the program, the worker received a specific allowance representing 83% of his or her previous wage. This percentage fell down to 70% during the four following months.
Statistics published by the French Ministry of Labour show that, since 1997, the gap between the number of workers who joined the program and the number that is potentially entitled to join has been closing. Indeed, throughout the first semester of 1999, 84.7% of the eligible workers joined it, while they were only 79.1% in 1996 (which was already a peak 6 due to the important number of layoffs that year).
The data
The estimation is carried out using data coming from two surveys collected by the French To evaluate the causal effect of the program, one has to contrast the situation of individuals after program participation with the counterfactual situation in the absence of participation.
Because the latter situation is not observable, it needs to be estimated based on the outcome of other individuals who do not participate, the so called control group. When choosing or constructing this control group, different adjustment procedures may be applied to ensure that participants and controls are identical with respect to all relevant characteristics except that of not participating. In experimental evaluations, the construction of an adequate control group is done by means of randomisation. When nonexperimental data are used, failure to take into account for discrepancies between participants and controls may lead to substantially biased judgements regarding the effect of the program. Here one has drawn the control group from the first survey in order to control for eligibility conditions at first stage. The control group is then only composed of individuals potentially entitled to join the program, which means that they respect the following imposed criteria used when applying to the program: they are under 57 years old, they are displaced and have at least two years of seniority in their previous firm. The whole sample, including both sub-samples (participants and non-participants), includes 1,912 observations. The date from which the effect of the retraining program is measured is chosen to be either the date of entry into the program for trainees, and the date of entry into the sampled unemployment spell for controls. 7 This approach is valid since the treated enter the program immediately after being laid off. Otherwise, bias might arise by the fact 7 After layoff, the trainees are not registered as unemployed. Empirical evidence shows that, in general, the time spent in a training program is principally devoted to training (see, for instance, Lalive et al., 2000) . Fitzenberger et al. (2009) show that, despite the lock-in effect resulting from the participation period, some programs may still have significant positive effects on employment rates in the medium and long run. These results confirm those previously obtained by Lechner (2004) .
that the most successful dismissed workers immediately find a job and only the unsuccessful ones finally decide to enter the program. At the program start, this population would not necessarily be comparable to the inflow into unemployment.
Descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples (participants and non-participants) are displayed in the appendix (Table A. employment. However, these crude statistics could be subject to a composition bias due to the individual heterogeneity of both subgroups. The statistical approach conducted in the next sections allows us to control for this heterogeneity.
Matching estimators
Evaluation methods usually try to compare two potential outcomes which are associated with two regimes, generally called "treatment" and "non-treatment". The regime is indicated by the value of a dummy variable D, which takes value 1 in the treatment regime and value 0 in the non-treatment case. Treatment is associated with an individual outcome denoted Y 1 while non-treatment generates an outcome denoted Y 0 . Moreover X denote pretreatment characteristics verifying the conditional independence assumption (CIA hereafter) which is required for implementing matching estimation techniques. This assumption states that :
This assumption means in particular that selection into the program (i.e. the treatment regime) is only based on observable characteristics and that all covariates affecting simultaneously assignment to treatment and potential outcomes are observed by the analyst. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that the CIA assumption implies that:
where the propensity score ( ) ( ) ( )
X. This last condition means that all individuals with the same X have the same probability to be treated or non-treated, and that a match can be found for all D = 1 persons. The CIA assumption also implies that the propensity score P(X) is balancing, namely:
This last property can help in determining which interactions and higher order terms to include for a given set of bqca covariates in the propensity score model (say, a logit or a probit model), even if it does not aid to choose which variables X to include. In particular, it implies that, if after conditioning on the estimated values of Pr(D = 1 | X) there is still dependence on X, the model used to estimate Pr(D = 1 | X) could be misspecified.
Under these assumptions, the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) can be written as: Equivalently, the average effect of the treatment on the untreated (ATU) can be written as:
The average treatment effect (ATE) for a randomly chosen individual is:
All matching estimators of the ATT parameter take the form:
and where I 1 denotes the set of participants, I 0 the set of nonparticipants, S P the region of common support, and n 1 the number of persons in the set I 1 ∩ S P . The counterfactual expectation for each individual i∈(I 1 ∩ S P ) is estimated as a weighted average over the outcomes of nonparticipants, the weight W(i, j) depending on the distance between the estimated propensity scores of individuals i and j, denoted and respectively.
i P j P Let C(P i ) denote a neighbourhood of the propensity score of individual i belonging to the participant sample. The neighbours of participant i are nonparticipants j whose score P j belongs to C(P i ). Matched nonparticipants belong to the subset A i = {j ∈ I 0 | P j ∈C(P i )}.
Alternative matching estimators differ in how the neighbourhood C(P i ) and the weights
For instance, the nearest-neighbour matching estimator without replacement is based on neighbourhoods: where G(.) is a kernel function and a n is a bandwidth parameter. Here the weights are defined by:
and the neighbourhood C(P i ) depends on the specific kernel function that is chosen.
In our application, we produce these three types of matching estimates by using the STATA modules psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) and pscore (Becker and Ichino, 2002) . Since the samples used in our evaluation are choice-based with program participants oversampled, we match on the odds ratio P/(1-P), as suggested by Smith and Todd (2005, p. 319). 9 6. Results
Validity of the matching procedure
Before implementing the matching procedure, we must argue about its validity in our context. For that purpose, we first need to detail the process through which workers may have access to the program. In principle, each employer firing workers for economic reasons, whatever their number and their wages, should propose to these workers to participate in the program. 10 More precisely, the employer must notify the employees concerned by registered mail (with acknowledgement of receipt) the proposal to participate 9 Estimates obtained by matching on the propensity score P are close to those obtained by matching on the odds ratio. They are not reproduced but are available from the authors. 10 Workers laid-off for personal reasons, such as inadequate performance or misconduct, cannot participate in the program. It is thus possible that some employers could have been tempted to transform layoffs for economic reasons into layoffs for personal reasons.
in the program, with the photocopy of the agreement the firm has signed with the State (i.e.
with the local representatives of the Ministry of Labour). In this letter, the employer must also detail the re-employment possibilities of the laid-off workers within the firm (for instance, after participation in the program). However, the employer is not constrained to choose this option. If he/she decides not to propose the program to the laid-off workers, he/she has to pay to the ASSEDIC (which is the institution in charge of raising unemployment insurance contributions in France) a penalty whose amount is equal to one monthly gross wage for each laid-off worker. Consequently it is likely that firms with sufficiently "deep pockets" (in particular, the biggest ones) could be more willing to pay the penalty. This argument leads us to control for the size of the firm when choosing the regressors incorporated into the propensity score model. 11 When layoffs result from a plant closing, the employer has probably much more difficulties to detail the possibilities of future re-employment within another plant (if the firm has several plants). Moreover, in the case of a plant closing, it is generally more difficult to organize a program session because of the limited capacity of training centres. These last arguments could explain why the occurrence of a plant closing makes the participation in the program less likely.
Participation in the program is not mandatory. The worker has three weeks from the receipt of the employer's letter in which he may accept (or eventually refuse) the proposal to participate in the program. Nevertheless, he/she has strong incentives to participate: during the program, he/she receives an allowance equal to 83.4% of his/her previous wage in the first two months, and then equal to 70.4% of this wage as from the third month. For comparison, if he/she refuses to participate and enters unemployment after his/her layoff, the amount of his/her UI benefit is equal to 57.4% of his/her previous wage. Moreover, if he/she does not finds a new job at the end of the program (which generally lasts six months), he/she is still eligible to UI (with the usual UI replacement ratio), and the length of his/her overall period of eligibility to UI is only reduced by two months and a half.
Thus, for explaining why the worker may not enter the program, we have to control for the determinants that influence both his/her decision to join the program as well as his/her future labour market performance.
Like in previous studies using matching techniques for the evaluation of ALMPs (see, for instance, Lechner et al., 2005 , Sianesi, 2008 , Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008 11 Unfortunately, we have no information on the market value of the firm (like its profit or its market share). However, to control for the remaining differences in terms of unemployment rate and of labour demand across these eight labour markets, we take into account the value of the unemployment/vacancy ratio U/V defined as the number of unemployed persons divided by the number of vacant jobs in the local labour market where the individual lives. The participation in the program being voluntary, its evaluation by a matching procedure (based on the conditional independence assumption and on the hypothesis of selection on observables) could be subject to a motivation bias, which could still be present after controlling for the whole list of observable variables that we have presented. 12 When discussing the results, we should keep in mind this problem which possibly produces an overestimation of the average treatment effect.
The propensity score
The first step of the statistical analysis consists in estimating the probability to participate in the program. The set of control variables affecting this probability includes individual characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, number of children, education, nationality (French citizenship or not), and characteristics of the previous job such as its skill level, the size of the firm, the seniority in this job, and the reason for the layoff (plant closing or not). 13 We also include in this list some indicators of the local labour market 12 If motivation affects both the probability to work and to enter the program, the treatment effect could be confounded by unobservables. 13 We tried to robustify the specification of the selection model by including interaction terms (for instance, between gender and the number of children, between gender and age, etc.) and the past employment history conditions. For that purpose, in a first specification, we incorporate the ratio U j /V defined as the number of unemployed persons of type j divided by the number of vacanbs in the local labour market where the individual lives. The value of this ratio is taken either at the date of entry into the program (for trainees) or at the date of entry into the unemployment spell (for controls). For constructing the numbers U j of unemployed persons, we consider six socio-demographic groups (j = 1,…,6), each gender being split into three age groups (less than 30, between 30 and 49, 50 and more). In an alternative model, these ratios are simply replaced by indicators of the region of residence. The probability to participate in the retraining program is assumed to be generated by a logit model whose parameter estimates are reported in Table 1a . This table reveals that parameter estimates are quite similar under both specifications (in model 1 with U j /V variables, and in model 2 with regional dummies).
First, we observe that the probability to join the program is lower for women, foreigners (non-French citizens), persons having at least three children, blue-collar workers, and for workers previously employed in a firm with more than 200 employees. Conversely, this probability is significantly higher for young workers (less than 25 years old), executives, those who incurred a collective layoff not associated with a plant closure, and for those who stayed more than three years in the previous firm. The ratio of the number of young unemployed workers over the number of vacancies in the local labour market has a significant effect on the probability of entering the program. However, this effect has opposite signs for both genders. The probability of participating in the retraining program increases with the relative number of young unemployed men, while it decreases with the relative number of young unemployed women. The same contrast is observed for the tightness ratios concerning older unemployed workers, but the associated parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 10%-level only. Model 2 reveals that the probability to participate in the retraining program is statistically higher in the Nord-Pasde-Calais region. The region of common support calculated by the STATA module pscore appears to be large and similar for both specifications (see the last line in Table 1a ). The numbers of deleted observations due to the common support condition are shown in Table   ( for instance, the number of unemployment spells prior to the last job, and the duration of the longest previous unemployment spell) as additional covariates. None of these interaction terms or additional covariates (except the duration of the longest previous unemployment spell) appears to be statistically significant. However, when introducing the duration of the longest previous unemployment spell in the 1b; these numbers are quite low. Figures 1 and 2 represent the distributions of propensity scores estimated in each group (treated and non-treated) with models 1 and 2, respectively.
These distributions look alike, except in the lower (respectively, upper) tail of the distribution since low (respectively, high) values of the estimated propensity score are more frequent for non-treated (respectively, treated) individuals.
Propensity scores estimated with models 1 and 2 verify the balancing property (according to tests implemented with STATA modules psmatch2 and pscore). However this is not the case for the estimated propensity score resulting from the more general logit model in which ratios U j /V and region dummies are simultaneously introduced as regressors.
Consequently, matching estimates that are reported hereafter are those obtained with the propensity score resulting from model 1 (with ratios U j /V). Matching estimates deduced from model 2 are quite similar.
14 propensity score, the balancing score property is no longer verified. Consequently, this additional variable has been finally excluded from the list of regressors affecting the selection equation. 14 They are not reported here, but are available from the authors.
Table 1a
Estimated parameters of the propensity score (logit models) Remarks: Statistical significance levels that are indicated correspond to 0.1% (***), 1% (**) and 5% (*).
Table 1b
Numbers of deleted observations due to the common support requirement 
Matching estimates
The first outcome that we consider is the proportion of time spent in employment during the second and third years after the entry into the program (for the trainees) and into unemployment (for controls). 15 The results are reported in Tables 2. All tables give various matching estimates, obtained with different matching techniques: nearest-neighbour matching (without replacement), radius caliper matching, and kernel matching, this last method being implemented with three different kernel functions (Gaussian, biweight, and uniform). At each date, three average effects have been estimated with each matching method:
• the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), or equivalently, the average effect of the program for the workers who actually participate in this program, • the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU), or equivalently, the average effect of the program for those who do not participate in the program, • the average treatment effect (ATE), or equivalently, the average effect of the program for a randomly chosen laid-off worker.
The matching estimates are always statistically different from zero, at least at the 1% level of significance, and they indicate that the retraining program increases the proportion of time spent in employment by approximately 6.5 points during the second year and by approximately 5.7 points of percentage during the third year after the date of entry into the program. These estimated effects are similar for trainees and controls. Consequently, the estimated average effect for the whole sample has the same value.
As noticed in the introduction, Farber (1999 Farber ( , 2003 found that workers who lose their jobs are more likely to be reemployed in temporary jobs. 16 Thus it is particularly important to assess whether the retraining program help workers who participate to find a permanent job (namely, a job with a long-term labour contract) compared to otherwise identical nonparticipants. Consequently, we have also used matching techniques to estimate the effect of the retraining program on the proportion of time spent in regular employment during the 2 nd and 3 rd years after entry into the program. 17 Tables 3 contain the an amount between 5.5, and 6 points during the 3 rd year. Thus, the increase in their reemployment rate is due to an increase of their reemployment probability in regular jobs, namely jobs under long-term contracts the increase. 18 The time spent in regular employment would have also increased for non-participants, by approximately 7.5 points of percentage during the 2 nd year and by 5.7 during the 3 rd year.
In a further analysis, we have compared the estimated effects of the program for different subgroups. More precisely, we have conducted the analysis by distinguishing genders, skill levels (two categories: white-collars, skilled workers and executives on one side, and bluecollar workers on the other) and age (three age groups). Outcome is the time spent in employment in the 2 nd and 3 rd years after the date of entry into the program. Results are reported in Tables 4, 5 , 6a and 6b. First, matching estimates show that, in terms of this outcome, the retraining program is principally beneficial for men (Tables 4) and for adult workers between 30 and 50 years old (see Tables 6a and 6b ). Within these categories, both trainees and non-trainees have, or would have, benefited from their participation in the program. This result could mean that the program has been mainly beneficial (and possibly better adapted) to the displaced workers with a higher labour market experience. This interpretation is in line with the conclusion of the study conducted by Kodrzycki (1997) who observes that, in the case of job training programs proposed to displaced workers in Massachusetts in the early nineties, "different types of training are used by different types of displaced workers and have different degrees of effectiveness": relatively short training programs (i.e. less than one year) which consist mainly in vocational training benefit mainly to workers with a higher ability and a longer work history, while training combining vocational and general education, which corresponds generally to longer programs (i.e. more than one year), is better adapted to workers with lower past 17 In our study, permanent jobs correspond to long-term labour contracts. Fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work and subsidized jobs are excluded from this category. The limited size of our sample prevents us to do a more precise analysis by distinguishing other categories such as full-time jobs versus part-time jobs.
The distinction between permanent jobs versus temporary jobs appears to be relevant in order to examine the average quality of the corresponding jobs. For instance, in 1996, which is the median year of our survey, the average net monthly wage of workers occupied in permanent jobs was equal to 10,170 French francs, and 87 % among them worked full-time; the same year, the average net monthly wage of workers occupied in temporary jobs was equal to 6,810 French francs, and 69 % only were employed full-time (source: "Enquête sur l 'emploi", INSEE, Paris, 1996) .
experience. Finally, let us remark that, in the 3 rd year after entry, women who have been retrained spend more time in employment (4 percentage points more), but those who do not participate would have also gained (by the same amount). For the two skill groups that we consider (blue-collars vs. white-collars, high-skilled workers and executives), estimated effects of the program are statistically significant, but they are quite similar (see Tables 5) .
Tables 2
Matching Remarks: In each table, bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the untreated. ATE is the average treatment effect.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this article was to estimate the impact of a retraining program targeted to displaced workers on their return to permanent employment. This program, called "Convention de conversion", was set up in France during the eighties. It consisted in providing an immediate and individual support to displaced workers for a period of six months (beginning just after the dismissal) by proposing retraining and job seeking assistance. Our matching estimates show that this program succeeded in increasing the employment rate of trainees by approximately 6 points of percentage in the medium-term, namely in the second and third years after the date of entry into the program. This improvement is essentially due to an increase of their employment rate in regular jobs (i.e. jobs under long-term labour contracts). This last result is particular important since Farber (1999, 2003) noticed that, in the absence of any intervention, displaced workers are more likely to be reemployed in temporary jobs. We have also found that this French retraining program has been principally beneficial for adult workers between 30 and 50 years old, i.e.
for the displaced workers with a higher labour market experience. Consequently, a longer program, combining intensively general and vocational education, could have been more beneficial for displaced workers with the shortest work histories.
Our findings confirm and complement two sets of previous results:
• First, intensive (re)training programs designed for laid-off workers have positive effects not only their subsequent wages (see, for instance, Jacobson et al., 2005, and Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008) , but also on their employment rates, and especially on their employment rate in regular jobs (with long-term labour contracts); • Second, these programs, like some other active labour market programs (see, for instance, Lechner, 2004 , Jespersen et al., 2008 , and Fitzenberger et al., 2009 other examples), have medium-and long-run effects on the employment rate of trainees.
In a further research, it would be worthwhile to focus on the effectiveness of retraining programs proposed to displaced workers laid off from shrinking industries (for instance, traditional manufacturing industries). In particular, it should been assessed whether such workers (in particular, the oldest ones) need longer training programs, with a higher content in terms of general (and possibly vocational) education, and whether such programs help them to change occupations. In economies with changing job opportunities, this issue is crucial for public policy. 
